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1. INTRODUCTION 
After many years of negotiation, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) came into force in 1988. Today, 62 states have adopted 
the CISG.  Together these countries account for over two-thirds of all world trade.2 On this 
basis alone, the CISG is an outstanding success in the legal harmonisation of the law governing 
the international sale of goods.  However, the CISG has its critics and much comment has been 
made on the failure of the CISG to achieve its goal of promoting international trade through a 
body of uniform rules.   
The primary motivation driving the push for a harmonised law on the international sale of 
goods is economic: a harmonised law makes it easier and more efficient for the business person 
to sell and buy goods across state borders.  However, the engine driving the push for 
harmonisation is political and cultural; and the task of creating the harmonised law belongs to 
the diplomat.3  A study of the CISG demonstrates that the political and cultural demands on 
the diplomat also act as shackles that restrain the achievement of a harmonised law.   
This paper will consider the CISG and discuss the constraints on treaty making as a mechanism 
for legal harmonisation.  Part one discusses the constraints faced when creating a uniform text.  
Part two discusses the problems with the text of the CISG that result from the negotiation 
process.  Finally, part three discusses the constraints faced in maintaining the uniformity of the 
CISG. 
 
2. THE DIPLOMATS 
2.1 The CISG and the Promotion of International Trade 
The preamble of the CISG reads like a petition.  In adopting the CISG, States are attesting 
their commitment to the purpose of the CISG as set out in the preamble.  The preamble states:   
‘THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION, 
BEARING IN MIND the broad objectives in the resolution adopted by the sixth special 
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, 
CONSIDERING that the development of international trade on the basis of equality 
and mutual benefit is an important element in promoting friendly relations among 
States, 
BEING OF THE OPINION that the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts 
for the international sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic 
                                                 
2 <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/cisgintro.html> The Pace University website dedicated to the CISG includes a map of the 
globe that details the countries of the world that have adopted the CISG.  The wide acceptance of the CISG is immediately 
evident.  Sixty-one countries have adopted the CISG as of 1 May 2002.        
3 Arthur Rosett, ‘Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commercial Law’, 
(1992) 40 The American Journal of Comparative Law 683, 684. 
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and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade 
and promote the development of international trade, 
HAVE DECREED as follows:’4 
What follows is a treaty comprising 101 articles that deal with the scope of the CISG,5 rules 
governing the formation of contracts for the international sale of goods,6 the rights and 
obligations of the buyer and seller arising from the contract7 and details of when the CISG 
comes into force and the reservations and declarations permitted.8   
2.2 The long and winding road  
The CISG in its final form however has a long history that is a testament to the constraints on 
treaty making as mechanism for legal harmonisation.  A brief examination of the history of the 
CISG demonstrates two important points: first, treaty making is a both a labor and time 
intensive process and, second, the process is unlikely to succeed unless it is inclusive of states.   
The twentieth century trend towards the unification of laws in multinational treaties that 
govern transnational commerce has its origin in the Middle Ages and the development of the 
lex mercatoria.9  However, the modern day CISG has its origins in international attempts to 
create a uniform law for the international sale of goods which commenced in the 1930s.   
The Governing Council of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT) developed the first draft of a uniform law on the sale of goods in 1935.  After the 
interruption of the World War II and several further drafts, two conventions were approved in 
1964 at a conference at The Hague.  These conventions were the Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods (“ULIS”) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (“ULF”).10   
Only 28 states participated in the 1964 Hague conference that approved the ULIS and ULF 
and only nine countries gave force to these treaties.  The failure of these treaties to win wider 
acceptance is in part attributed to the dominant influence of the civil law traditions of Western 
Europe11 and to the neglect of both Socialist and Third World countries.  The Socialist and 
Third World countries refused to enact the ULIS and ULF because they considered that these 
conventions were modelled on the demands of the industrialised states.12  Accordingly, the 
                                                 
4 Preamble to the CISG.   
5 See Part I, Articles 1 - 13 of the CISG. 
6 See Part II, Articles 14 – 24 of the CISG.  
7 See Part III, Articles 25 – 88 of the CISG. 
8 See Part IV, Articles 89 – 101 of the CISG.  For a brief overview of the structure and scope of the CISG, see John Felemegas, 
‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’ 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/felemegas.html>. 
9 Franco Ferrari, ‘Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law’ (1994) 24 The Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 183, 184. Also published at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/franco.html>.  A comparison of the 
CISG and the lex mercatoria from the perspective of harmonising international law is also interesting as they represent different 
approaches to harmonisation.  The CISG being harmonisation by multi-national treaty developed by nation states and 
administered by the courts (and arbitrators) whereas the lex mercatoria was based on mercantile customs, was administered by 
merchants and had an informal procedure.   
10 Ibid, 189.   
11 Philip Hackney, ‘Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods Achieving Uniformity?’ (2001) 61 
Louisiana Law Review 473. 
12 Ferrari, above n 8, 190.  
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lesson learned from the failure of the Hague conventions to gain wide acceptance was that the 
successful harmonisation of laws governing the international sale of goods requires broad based 
participation in the drafting process. 
In 1966, following the failure of the Hague conventions the United Nations established the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and gave it the task of 
promoting the harmonisation of international trade law.  After 10 years of negotiation and 
drafting, UNCITRAL produced the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention.  In 1980, 62 
countries participated in a diplomatic conference in Vienna, reviewed the 1978 Draft 
Convention and, after some amendments, unanimously approved the CISG.13  
After two failed treaties and the better part of half a century, the CISG finally came into force 
in 1988 and today 61 countries have adopted it.14  The factor that distinguished the CISG in its 
success from the two Hague conventions was the widespread participation by representatives of 
States from all parts of the globe in its drafting.15   
2.3 Clash and compromise  
As an exercise in harmonisation, the CISG demonstrates the predicament that faced its authors 
in creating an international uniform law and the mechanisms used to overcome these hurdles.  
Gyula Eörsi, a delegate representing Hungary at the CISG drafting conventions and a leading 
author on the CISG, explains the predicament in an satirical play script titled ‘Unifying The 
Law (A Play In One Act, With A Song)’, which commences as follows.16 
‘Chairman/Bang!/The discussion is open on art. 1.  The distinguished delegate from 
Knowhowland has asked for the floor. 
The Delegate from Knowhowland: Thank you Mr. Chairman.  My delegation proposes that 
art. 1 should read as follows: “The dog shall bark.”  Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
The Delegate from Oraculum: With greatest respect Mr. Chairman, this proposition runs 
against all experience.  My delegation proposes the following wording: “The cat shall 
mewl.”  Thank you. 
The Delegate from Knowhowland: My delegation is terribly sorry to disagree with my friend 
from Oraculum, Mr. Chairman, but I have to remind you that my proposal stating that 
“The Dog Shall Bark” is backed by a 700 year old, uninterrupted line of court decisions 
in my country.  Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
                                                 
13 Felemegas, above n 7.  
14 A common problem with the harmonisation of law by treaty making is the long period of time it takes to encourage states to 
ratify the treaty.  Albert Kritzer explains that ‘[r]atification of conventions on international commercial law normally proceeds at 
a glacial pace.  However, CISG ratification quadrupled in the few short years since it came into effect’: see Albert Kritzer, ‘The 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Scope, Interpretation and Resources’ (1995) Cornell Review of the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 147.  Also published at 
<http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kritzer.html>.  
15 Felemegas, above n 7.  ‘At the 1965 Hague Conference, which finalized ULIS and ULF, 28 countries took part: 22 European 
or other developed Western countries, 3 socialist, and 3 developed countries.  At the 1980 Vienna Conference which adopted 
the CISG, 62 states took part: 22 European and other developed Western states,  11 socialist, 11 South-American, 7 African 
and 11 Asian countries; in other words, roughly speaking, 22 Western, 11 socialist and 29 “third world” countries.’: Gyula 
Eörsi, ‘A Propos For The 1980 Vienna Convention On Contracts For The International Sale Of Goods’  (1983) 31 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 333, 335. 
16 Gyula Eörsi, ‘Unifying The Law (A Play In One Act, With A Song)’ (1977) 25 The American Journal of Comparative Law 658.   
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The Delegate from Oraculum: Without underestimating, Mr. Chairman, the erudition, 
frugality and creative force of the courts and the importance of judge-made law, may I call 
your attention to the fact that the proposal tabled by the delegation of the Republic of 
Oraculum stating “The Cat Shall Mewl” is warranted not only by our Civil Code but also 
by our greatest brains in legal thinking from the early 18th century up to the present days 
and is sociologically correct.  Thank you Mr. Chairman.’ 
The call for the harmonisation of laws on the international sale of goods assumes that there are 
differences in the domestic legal techniques of states.  Amongst the States represented at the 
diplomatic convention that authored the CISG, the differences in legal technique were most 
evident in conflicts between common law and civil law systems.  There were also considerable 
differences between the Socialist and Western legal systems and between developed and 
developing countries.17 The following examples illustrate these differences in legal concepts.     
• In common law systems, contracts require consideration to be enforceable.  However, 
consideration is not a concept recognised by civil law countries.18  
• Common law and civil law systems have different rules that state when an acceptance to 
an offer is effective.19  Under the civil law receipt theory, if a party posts his or her 
acceptance to an offer but the acceptance is lost or delayed in transmission, the risk of 
the loss or delay falls on the person accepting the offer.  That is, acceptance does not 
become effective until it is received by the offeror.  Under the common law, however, 
acceptance is effective on its dispatch.20 
• Civil law systems are sympathetic to the issue of specific performance, whereas common 
law courts place strict restrictions on the circumstances in which it will be allowed.21    
• Socialist systems generally require a contract to be in writing whereas Western systems do 
not.22   
• Western legal systems allow a contract to come into being if the price or the way of fixing 
the price are absent from the contract.  However, Socialist legal systems do not allow a 
contract to come into being in this situation.23 
The business person who is familiar with the law that governs international trade and 
international contracts has a clear commercial advantage over the business person who is not 
familiar with the law.  Accordingly, each state representative at the conferences that debated 
and developed the CISG had an economic interest in promoting a harmonised law that most 
                                                 
17 Eörsi, above n 14, 346-352 (for a discussion on the conflict between developed and developing countries see Eörsi, above n 
14, 349-352); Sara Zwart, ‘The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between Socialist, Third World, Common, and 
Civil Law Principles’ (1988) 13 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 109-128, also published at 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/Zwart.html>. 
18 The CISG adopts the civil law approach and makes no mention of the doctrine of consideration.   
19 The CISG generally adopts the civil law approach although not exclusively.  The CISG compromise is discussed further in 
part two.   
20 Eorsi, above n 14, 311.  
21 The CISG compromise is discussed further in part two. 
22 The CISG compromise is discussed further in part two. 
23 Eorsi, above n 14, 341-342. 
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reflected their domestic legal system.  Underlying this selfish motivation is the natural tendency 
“to assume that what is familiar is probably better than what is new and strange”.24   
The examples listed above demonstrate the fundamental differences in legal technique between 
the different States.  The existence of these differences, coupled with the interest of each State 
to promote its own legal techniques and their ‘know-how’ advantages, meant reaching a 
consensus was extremely difficult.  The drafting of the CISG involved reaching compromises on 
important legal concepts rather than the ‘best’ legal concepts.  Arthur Rosett describes the 
process of reaching consensus as follows. 
‘The delegates of sixty-two participating nations did not reach consensus by a magical 
process.  The majority, representing nations that follow the civil-law tradition, did not 
suddenly realize the virtues of the common-law approach to contract and commercial 
transactions.  Nor did the representatives of states with planned socialist economies 
suddenly recognise the virtues of free enterprise and the private allocation of risks by 
contract.  And the many representatives of poorer and underdeveloped nations did not 
come to a new appreciation of the plight of the wealthy creditors of the world.  After 
thirty years of hard technical negotiation by experts, worldwide agreement was by 
diplomatic compromise.’25 
Returning for a moment to the perplexing question of barking dogs or mewling cats, Eörsi also 
offers a compromise in the spirit of harmonisation.   
‘The Delegate from Balcony: …But with your permission Sir, I have a tentative proposal 
which I put forward in the spirit of compromise.  We could say “An animal shall make a 
noise.”  This would cover both proposals and would also satisfy our business circles.  
Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
The Delegate from Transcendentia: This proposal, Mr Chairman, has a certain appeal to my 
delegation.  May I remark, however, that not all kinds of animals are capable of making a 
noise.  I have particularly fish in mind, Sir. 
The Delegate from Balcony: Well Sir, this depends on how the words “shall make a noise” 
are construed.’26 
2.4 Methodology of Compromise 
Professor John Honnold served as Chief of the United Nations International Trade Law 
Branch and Secretary of UNCITRAL during the drafting of the CISG.  Professor Honnold 
argues that the methods employed by the authors of the CISG to overcome the conceptual 
barriers of their own legal background to reach a common and acceptable solution made 
reaching a consensus decision easier.27   
                                                 
24 Eorsi, above n 14, 311. 
25 Arthur Rosett, ‘Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ 
(1984) 45 Ohio State Law Journal 265-305 <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rossett.html>. 
26 Eorsi, above n 15, 659.   
27 Amy Kastely, ‘The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention’ (1988) 63 Washington Law Review 607, also published at 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kastely1.html>. 
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Rather than commencing with proposed legislative drafts, Professor Honnold explains that the 
delegates used the common-law case method whereby delegates focused on hypothetical 
situations and sought consensus on the desired outcome.  The delegates focused on results and 
not legislative words.  Professor Honnold argues that this method was more conducive to 
compromise and overcame some of the constraints on treaty making as a mechanism for legal 
harmonisation. 
‘What came next was, for me, even more significant: the relative ease with which 
delegates, from different backgrounds, reached agreement on results.  Some will say this 
shows that there is a universal natural law – others, that there are basic principles of 
commercial and legal efficiency, just as survival in the sea (beyond the reef) … molded the 
dolphin and the shark into almost identical lines although they entered the sea from 
wildly different backgrounds. 
To return to dry land: After agreement was reached on what results should flow from a 
series of factual cases, it was not too difficult to agree on words to express the result.’28 
Article 67 of the CISG is an example of this ‘results-orientated’ process.  Article 67 provides: 
 ‘(1) … the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are handed over to the first carrier for 
transmission to the buyer in accordance with the contract of sale. … 
  (2) Nevertheless, the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified 
to the contract, whether by markings on the goods, by shipping documents, by 
notices given to the buyer or otherwise.’ 
The purpose of Article 67 is to describe when risk passes to the buyer.  In doing so the drafters 
have used words to describe a specific event typical of international transactions, being the 
handing over of goods from the seller to a carrier for transmission to the buyer.  Having agreed 
on the desired outcome, words to describe that result were not difficult to find.   
Article 67 is also important because of the language that it does not use.  The issue in Article 67 
is the point in time when risk passes.  In common law systems, this issue would normally be 
coupled with concepts such as ‘delivery’, ‘property’ and ‘title’ to explain the law.  These words 
and concepts have deliberately been excluded from Article 67 because they are words and 
concepts sourced from one legal system and have specific legal nuances associated with them.29   
However, the drafters could not avoid using language sourced from one legal system 
completely.  Some language and concepts found in the CISG are familiar to domestic legal 
concepts of some States.  Part two below will discuss the issues that arise from this practice 
and the consequences for the harmonisation process.   
 
                                                 
28 Professor Honnold quoted in Kastely, above n 26, 608.  Eörsi also speaks of the tradition that developed in UNCITRAL of a 
‘readiness for compromise’, in Eorsi, above n 15, 323. 
29 Felemegas, above n 7. 
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3. CISG & THE UNEASY COMPROMISE  
3.1 A Compromise on Harmony 
As demonstrated with the compromise proposed by the delegate from Balcony in Eörsi’s play, 
the politically expedient compromise is not without its own problems.  The same is certainly 
true with the CISG and the concessions made to appease the competing demands of the state 
representatives.  That is to say, the formation and adoption of a multinational treaty such as the 
CISG is a political process and by necessity this process requires compromise.  These 
compromises however often create additional complications, as argued by Arthur Rosett. 
‘The difficulty with many of these apparent compromises is that they simply do not 
resolve the problem they purport to address.  They do not reflect two parties having 
yielded part of their positions to each other for the sake of agreement, but rather two 
sides agreeing to give the appearance by verbal formula which does not provide 
meaningful guidance in concrete situations.’30 
Part II of this paper will discuss some examples of the ‘uneasy compromises’ found within the 
text of the CISG that are symptomatic of the multinational treaty negotiation process. 
These compromises take on further significance in the context of the purpose of the CISG, 
being the promotion of international trade through the creation of uniform law.  This purpose 
is emphasised in Article 731 of the CISG, which dictates that regard must be had to the need to 
promote uniformity in the application of the CISG.32  Uniform application is fundamental for 
the successful harmonisation of laws by international treaty.  Accordingly, to the extent that 
compromises within the text of the CISG derogate from its uniform application, they also 
detract from the success of the CISG as an exercise in harmonisation.   
3.2 Scope of the CISG 
The first question asked by both business and legal practitioners when considering the CISG is 
when does it apply?  Accordingly, a clear definition of the jurisdictional scope of the CISG is 
crucial to both its understanding and success.  However, the ambiguity of the jurisdictional 
scope of the CISG has received much criticism.33 
                                                 
30 Rosett, above n 24, 282. 
31 Article 7 is discussed in greater detail in Part III of this paper. 
32 Susanne Cook suggests that the CISG ‘uses urgent language when it refers to uniformity.  There is a “need” for uniformity 
which is thereby elevated to a critical, obligatory consideration – one that every court dealing with the provisions of the 
Convention has to entertain and which, in the Convention’s spirit, cannot be discounted.’: Susanne Cook, ‘The need for 
uniform interpretation of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1988) 50 
The University of Pittsburgh Law Review 197, 212, also published at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/1cook.html>.  
33 See Rosett, above n 24.; Arthur Rosett, ‘Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in 
International Commercial Law’, (1992) 40 The American Journal of Comparative Law 683; Trevor Cox, ‘Chaos versus uniformity: 
the divergent views of software in the International Community’, (2000) 4 The Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law 
and Arbitration 3, also published at <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/cox.html>; Frank Diedrich, ‘Maintaining 
Uniformity in International Uniform Law Via Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the CISG’ (1996) 8 Pace 
International Law Review 303, also published at <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/Diedrich.html>; Camilla Baach 
Andersen, ‘Uniformity in the CISG in the first decade of its application’ 
<http://www.ccls.edu/eclu/events/Schmitthoff/SYMPOSIUM_Draft_1-3.html>; Hannu Honka, ‘Harmonization of Contract 
Law Through International Trade: A Nordic Perspective’(1996) 11 The Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 111; James Bailey, 
‘Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of 
International Sales’ (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 273.   
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As early as the 1960s UNCITRAL recognised the failure of the ULIS to adequately define its 
jurisdiction and the imperative that this issue be rectified in the CISG.  Many options were 
considered, however the solution in Article 1 of the CISG is said to be even ‘inferior to the 
imperfect solution of ULIS’.34  Article 1(1) of the CISG states that: 
‘This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of 
business are in different States: 
(a)  when the States are Contracting States; or 
(b)  when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a 
Contracting State.’ 
The first observation to be made of Article 1 is the omission of the word ‘international’.  
Significantly, this word is only found in the title of the CISG but is otherwise absent from the 
text of the treaty.  Rather than determining the application of the CISG by the movement of 
goods across State borders, the authors of the CISG chose to apply the criterion of ‘place of 
business’. 
The drafters of the CISG were unable to agree on an adequate definition of an ‘international 
transaction’.35  Arthur Rosett argues this was due to the fact that international trade is 
increasingly integrated and does not in practice exist as a distinct category of trade.  The fear 
preventing the drafters from adopting the concept of international transaction to define the 
scope of the CISG was the concern that the jurisdictional net of the CISG would be spread 
wider than intended.36    
A compromise was reached and the scope of the CISG was defined instead by reference to the 
parties’ ‘place of business’.  But this concept also has problems that may give rise to uncertainty 
and dissonance.  For example, Article 10 outlines how a party’s place of business is to be 
determined.  James Bailey argues that, as a result of the rules in Article 10, ‘the CISG can apply 
to transactions which are ostensibly domestic sales.’37  
A further problem with the scope of the CISG is the definition of ‘goods’.  The CISG does not 
define goods.  The uniform application of the CISG is therefore subject to courts and tribunals 
around the world applying a consistent definition of goods.38  This challenge is best illustrated 
with the example of software.39  Legal systems around the world treat software differently.40  
                                                 
34 Rosett, above n 24, 274.   
35 Ibid, 274-277.  Rosett demonstrates the difficult of defining an international transaction with the following example.  
‘Clearly, if parties enter into a contract that calls upon the seller to ship and deliver goods to the buyer’s nation before payment 
is due, the contract is international.  However, such transaction are not very common.  More frequently, the parties will make a 
C.I.F. contract that contemplates the packing, shipment, and insurance of goods from one country to another.  This is an 
international contract, even though the definition of a C.I.F. contract provides that title passes and risk of loss shifts from the 
seller to the buyer before the goods leave the seller’s country.’ 
36 Ibid.  
37 Bailey, above n 32, 301. Bailey offers the following example, ‘if a Paris-based branch office of a New York corporation buys a 
product from a party located in Indiana for delivery to a Montana address, that transaction may well be governed by the CISG 
because the parties to the transaction are located in separate CISG nations.  Deciding whether the CISG applies in that 
situation will hinge on a court’s application of Article 10.  Conversely, a court could decide that the CISG does not apply if the 
Paris office ordered delivery to its New York headquarters.  In that instance the court could conclude that New York is the 
location of the buyer because the New York office has the closest relationship “to the contract and its performance.”’  
38 Ibid, 303. 
39 See Cox, above n 32, 3; Diedrich, above n 32, 303. 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, issue 2003 #1
 
 
10 
Some, such as the United Kingdom,41 treat software not as a good but as a supply of a service.  
Others, such as Germany, treat software as a good.  If countries categorise software differently, 
there is a danger that an international contract for the sale of software will be treated by some 
courts as governed by the CISG and others as outside the scope of the CISG.   
Accepting the statement that a ‘clear, unambiguous, and simple definition of the Convention’s 
jurisdictional scope is critical to the success of the whole enterprise’,42 the ambiguities discussed 
above do not bode well for a uniform application of the CISG.   
3.3 Specific Performance 
As discussed above, civil law legal systems emphasise the non-breaching party’s right to compel 
performance of the breaching party’s obligations under contract.  Common law systems 
however prefer to award damages to the non-breaching party as opposed to compelling 
performance by the breaching party.43  The drafters of the CISG were unable to find a 
compromise solution to this specific performance conflict that promotes uniformtiy.  Instead, 
the compromise that found itself in the text of the CISG is described as an overt recognition of 
the failure to overcome obstacles to the unification of law.44    
Articles 46 and 62 are concessions to the civil law preference for specific performance.  Article 
46(1) states that: 
‘The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has 
resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.’ 
Conversely, this time setting out the seller’s rights, Article 62 states that: 
‘The seller may require to pay the price, take delivery or perform his other obligations, 
unless the seller has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.’ 
Article 28 however, described as the ‘enclave built into the realm of unified law’,45 states that: 
‘If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled to require 
performance of any obligation of the other party, a court is not bound to enter a 
judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in 
respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.’ 
Articles 42 and 62 state that specific performance is available under the CISG as a remedy.  
Article 28 contradicts this position and declares that States that do not recognise specific 
performance do not have to award it.  The compromise on specific performance impairs the 
unification of law because ‘bluntly speaking, everybody may apply his own law.’46 
                                                                                                                                                        
40 The issue would appear to also depend on the form of the software with courts making the distinction between software on a 
disk and software that is delivered electronically.   
41 Note, the United Kingdom is not a signatory to the CISG.  Whilst the countries that are signatories to the CISG account for 
over two thirds of world trade the absence of the United Kingdom and other important trading nations is a continuing 
challenge to the harmonisation of international sale of goods law.   
42 Rosett, above n 24, 273.   
43 Kastely, above n 26, 609–611.  
44 Eorsi, above n 14, 346.   
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid, 354. 
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3.4 Good Faith 
One of the most fiercely contested issues during the drafting of the CISG concerned the role of 
good faith.47  Article 7(1) of the CISG states: 
‘In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of 
good faith in international trade.’ 
This incarnation of good faith in Article 7 has been described variously as a ‘hard won 
compromise’,48 a ‘statesman like compromise’,49 a ‘strange compromise’50 and an ‘inconvenient 
compromise’.51  ‘Statesman like’ and ‘hard won’ because the divide between common law and 
civil law delegates on the issue was so great, and ‘strange’ and ‘inconvenient’ because of the 
uncertainty of the final result.   
While the approach to good faith in common law countries is not homogenous, there was a 
consensus amongst common law countries in their opposition to any reference to good faith 
being included in the CISG.  Civil law countries, on the other hand, argued for the inclusion 
in the CISG of a principle of good faith directed at governing the conduct of contractual 
parties.  Failing this, it was suggested by the civil law countries that good faith should apply to 
the interpretation of the contract.  With neither faction willing to surrender its position 
absolutely, a compromise was reached and good faith was ‘shifted to the provisions on 
interpretation of the Convention, thus… giving it an honorable burial.’52  
If the wealth of commentary on the meaning and effect of good faith in Article 7 is any guide, 
the uncertainty surrounding this statesman like compromise is set to continue.   
3.5 Revocation 
The process of forming a legally binding agreement differs greatly amongst legal systems.  One 
source of difference concerns the stage in a transaction in which the parties are free to 
withdraw.  At one extreme is the view that parties are free to terminate negotiations up to the 
point when the contract is concluded.  At the opposite end of the spectrum is the view that 
after entering negotiations it would be an act of bad faith to revoke an offer until the other side 
has had a chance to respond.53   
Article 16 of the CISG seeks to settle this issue by detailing when an offer can be revoked.  
Article 16 states: 
                                                 
47 The author also discusses this issue in Troy Keily, ‘Good Faith & the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods’ (1999) 3 The Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 15-40, also available at 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/keily.html>.   
48 N Povrzenic, ‘Interpretation and gap-filling under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods’ <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/povrzenic.html>.   
49 E. A. Farnsworth, ‘The Eason-Weinmann Colloquium on International and Comparative Law: Duties of good faith and fair 
dealing under the UNIDROIT Principles, relevant international conventions, and national laws’ 3 Tulane Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 47, 55.   
50 Eorsi, above n 14, 349. 
51 A Kritzer, International Contract Manual: Guides to Practical Applications, Kluwer, 70.   
52 Gyula Eörsi in Kritzer, above n 50.  
53 Rosett, above n 24.  
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‘(1) Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches the 
offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance. 
(2) However, an offer cannot be revoked: 
(a) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is 
irrevocable; or 
(b) if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the 
offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.’   
The choice of language used in Article 16 is interesting because it shows a compromise to 
appease both the civil law and common law positions by stating the same rule but in language 
sourced and familiar to each system.  As Eörsi explains, Article 16(2)(a) uses language familiar 
to civil lawyers and Article 16(2)(b) uses language familiar to common law lawyers, ‘[b]ut they 
both say the same thing’.54  Thus the compromise is ‘illusory’.55 
3.6 Reservations 
It is technically incorrect to speak of a single CISG text,56 as the CISG allows States to make 
specified reservations to its text. This mechanism was included to make the CISG more 
attractive to a wider range of states.  The consequence, however, is that States can tinker with 
the text and create their own version of the CISG - a concept that does not sit will with the 
objective of uniformity.   
Article 98 allows States wishing to become parties to the CISG to make reservations authorised 
by the CISG.  The CISG authorises the following reservations: 57 
• Article 92 authorises the exclusion of Part II (concerning formation of the contract) and 
Part III (concerning obligations of the buyer and seller and remedies for breach).  For 
example, the Scandinavian States have declared that they will not be bound by Part II of 
the CISG.   
• Article 93 permits a State in which two or more territorial units apply different systems 
of law to declare that the CISG does not extend to all of its territorial units.  Australia, 
for example, has declared that the CISG does not apply to the territories of Christmas 
Island, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and the Ashmore and Cartier Islands.  
• Article 94 allows a State that has an existing agreement regarding matters governed by 
the CISG to declare that the CISG does not apply to parties that have their place of 
business in that State.  The Scandinavian States have again exercised their right under 
Article 94 to exclude inter-Scandinavian trade from the CISG as a treaty already exists 
between these countries.   
                                                 
54 Eorsi, above n 14, 355-356. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Also note, there are six official language texts of the CISG, being Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.  
This poses a further challenge to uniformity because of the difficulty task of translating in each language texts that corresponds 
with each other.  This task is made more difficult because words used in one language will often be connected with implications 
that are not easily transcribed with a translation.  For a discussion on this issue see Felemegas, above n 7.  
57 See <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html>. 
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• Article 95 states that Article 1(1)(b), dealing with conflict rules when determining the 
jurisdiction of the CISG, may be excluded.  China, Singapore and the United States of 
America have each declared that they would not be bound by Article 1(1)(b).   
• Article 96 allows a State whose law requires contracts to be in or evidenced by writing to 
exclude any provision of Article 11, Article 29 or Part II (which provides that a contract 
need not be in writing under the CISG).  Countries including Argentina, Chile, Russia 
and China have made declarations under Article 96.       
The following example demonstrates the challenge to uniformity that arises from the inclusion 
in the CISG of the ability of States to make reservations.  Imagine a contract for the sale of 
goods between two parties whose places of business are respectively Australia and China.  Does 
the CISG apply?  Both states are signatories to the CISG but what if the Australian party has its 
place of business on Christmas Island?  Further, what is the consequence of the contract not 
being in writing?  The CISG provides that a written contract is not required, but the Chinese 
reservation under Article 96 throws this issue into uncertain waters.    
The Australia/China hypothetical explains how the CISG reservation procedure complicates 
the harmonisation process.  Without the reservations, parties to a transaction between Australia 
and China need be aware of only one law, the CISG.  However, as a result of the reservations, 
parties need be aware of three layers of law,58 being the standard CISG provisions, the 
reservations that Australia and China have made to the CISG, and the law of China regarding 
the sufficiency of writing in contract formation.   
Business supports the harmonisation of laws because harmony brings certainty.  The Australian 
business person is happy to sell goods to China because the uncertainty of submitting to a 
different legal system is ameliorated by the acceptance of the CISG by both countries.  
However, the reservations of both Australia and China detract from this certainty and are 
detrimental to uniformity.      
3.7 Comment 
The successful harmonisation of law by international treaty requires compromise.  As 
demonstrated by the examples in Part two, these compromises at times do not best serve the 
purpose of uniformity.  However, while these examples are a compromise on uniformity, they 
allow the drafting process to continue to completion, as explained in the following statement. 
‘Even compromises that are seemingly against unification in fact favor it by making it 
possible for the conference to continue its work to completion, figuratively saving the 
bulk of the cargo by throwing only a small part of it overboard.’59 
                                                 
58 Bailey, above n 32, 312-313.   
59 Eorsi, above n 14, 346. 
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4 MAINTAINING UNIFORMITY 
4.1 The Battle Front60 
Having agreed on a final text for the international sale of goods, the next challenge for 
harmonisation, and the ultimate success or failure of the CISG, is the uniform application of 
the CISG.  Part three of this paper will discuss the constraints countenanced in maintaining the 
uniformity of the text and the mechanism employed by the CISG to overcome these hurdles.   
Before proceeding. it is necessary to comment on the concepts of ‘harmonisation’ and 
‘unification’ as they relate to the CISG. 
4.2 Harmonisation and Unification 
Harmonisation and unification are related concepts.  They differ in the degree to which each 
tolerates variation. To harmonise is to bring together and make similar; to unify, however, is to 
make the same.  Unification does not tolerate variation.  Unification of the law therefore 
requires the law of States to be made the same.  Harmonisation of law is also understood as a 
process.  Therefore, unification of law is an exercise in harmonisation where ‘unification’ is the 
standard or benchmark.   
Article 7 of the CISG outlines the need to promote uniformity in the application of the CISG.  
Importantly, the CISG does not speak of the need to promote harmony in its application.  This 
distinction is important because, as the purpose of the CISG is the unification of international 
sale of goods law, there can be no variation in the way it is interpreted and applied by courts 
around the world.  The CISG does not permit room for error.  This point is also important 
because, by expressing the CISG’s purpose as the promotion of uniformity, the bar for 
determining its success or failure has been set higher.   
The absence of variation in the unification of law is subject to one caveat suggested by Professor 
Sundberg.  The Professor suggests that a margin of imperfection is permissible in the 
unification of law, but only to the extent that the variance does not encourage forum 
shopping.61  This proposition is best explained using the issue discussed above regarding 
software and the definition of ‘goods’ under the CISG.  
If a court in France determines that software is not a good, an international contract for the 
sale of software will not be governed by the CISG.  However, if a court in Canada decides that 
software is a good, the CISG will apply to the contract.  Adopting Professor Sundberg’s view, 
Camilla Andersen argues that: 
‘… any legal counsel representing a party who has breached an agreement in some way 
would be well advised to encourage his client to hurriedly forum-shop to a venue where 
software is not considered goods, to avoid the provisions of the pro-contractual CISG for 
breach.’62 
                                                 
60 John Felemegas argues that ‘[t]he area where the battle for international unification will be fought and won, or lost, is the 
interpretation of the CISG’s provisions.  Only if the CISG is interpreted in a consistent manner in all legal systems that have 
adopted it, will the effort put into its drafting be worth anything.’: see Felemegas, above n 7. 
61 Professor Sundberg quoted in Baach, above n 32.  
62 Ibid.  
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Therefore, the variation between the way States define software would be an unacceptable 
variation because the different approaches would encourage forum shopping to avoid the 
application of the CISG.     
4.3 Article 7 
Article 7 of the CISG is ‘arguably the single most important provision in ensuring the future 
success’63 of the CISG.  Article 7 details the objectives of the CISG and how to give effect to 
these objectives.  The battle for unification depends on the effectiveness of Article 7.64 
Article 7 defines the protocol to be followed when interpreting the CISG.  It directs those 
interpreting the CISG to take the following steps.  First, regard must be had to the CISG’s 
‘international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade’.  Second, questions not expressly settled by the 
CISG are to be determined ‘in conformity with the general principles on which it is based’.  
Third, in the absence of those general principles, questions are to be settled ‘in conformity with 
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.’  Steps two and three 
establish the mechanism to fill gaps in the CISG.  This paper will focus on step one.    
4.4 International Character & Uniformity 
Lawyers must not read the CISG as they would a piece of legislation in their home state.  To 
have regard to the international character of the CISG requires all lawyers to put aside the 
interpretative baggage with which they are familiar.  The CISG calls for a new interpretative 
method that stems from the requirement in Article 7 of the CISG to have regard to its 
international character and the need to promote uniformity.  
To have regard to the international character of the CISG involves recognition that it is a multi-
national treaty that has been incorporated into the domestic law of different legal systems.  
Practically speaking, the requirement to have regard to the international character of the CISG 
is a call for vigilance against two traps - the use of domestic techniques of legislative 
interpretation and reliance on the ‘homeward trend’ when interpreting the meaning of the 
CISG.  Each of these traps for harmonisation will be discussed below.   
4.5 International Interpretation   
When interpreting the CISG. it is important to avoid the techniques of legislative 
interpretation that would otherwise apply to domestic legislation.  The CISG is not a normal 
piece of domestic legislation but is an international treaty.  The CISG ‘should be seen as part of 
international law in the broad sense and should be entitled to an international, rather than 
national, interpretation.’65  Therefore, as opposed to the common law tendency to interpret 
                                                 
63 Phanesh Koneru, ‘The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
An Approach Based on General Principles’ (1997) 6 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 105, also available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koneru.html>.    
64 The full text of Article 7 states: 
     ‘(1) In the Interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade. 
      (2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in 
conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law 
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.’ 
65 Felemegas, above n 7. 
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domestic legislation narrowly, for example, the CISG should be given a broad interpretation.  
Professor Bonell explains the appropriate interpretative technique as follows. 
‘Instead of sticking to its literal and grammatical meaning, courts are expected to take a 
much more liberal and flexible attitude and to look, wherever appropriate, to the 
underlying purposes and policies of individual provisions as well as of the Convention as 
a whole.’66 
This international interpretation approach involves a rejection of the view that, in domestic 
proceedings, treaties ‘transform themselves into domestic law and therefore their interpretation 
and integration must take place according to the interpretative techniques … of the domestic 
systems in which they are transplanted and will be applied’.  This view cannot be reconciled 
with the requirement in Article 7 to pay regard to the international character of the CISG and 
the need to promote uniformity.   
4.6 Homeward Trend 
When searching for the meaning of terms used in the CISG, the international character of the 
CISG demands that care be taken to avoid the ‘homeward trend’ of interpreting terms in the 
CISG in accordance with domestic understandings.  The CISG directs that answers be found 
within the four corners of the CISG.  The homeward trend is the ethnocentric propensity to 
interpret an international convention such as the CISG in accordance with domestic principles 
and concepts.  That is, the ‘temptation for judges and the parties settling disputes … to look at 
what is familiar especially as it appears to be so at first glance.’67   
Parts of the CISG are familiar to concepts used in legal systems around the world.  However, it 
is an error to refer to these domestic concepts when interpreting the CISG.  To promote 
uniformity and give effect to the CISG’s international character, the CISG must be interpreted 
as an autonomous legal instrument.   
This approach was exemplified in the recent decision of the United States District Court in 
Zapata Hermanos Sucesores v. Hearthside Baking Co.68 This case involved a contract for the sale of 
goods under the CISG.  The court held that the award of damages to the seller for a breach of 
contract included counsel’s fees as foreseeable consequential damages under Article 74 of the 
CISG. 69  Importantly, in reaching its decision, the court rejected the buyer’s argument that in 
an American court the ‘American Rule’, that requires litigants in federal court actions to bear 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Bruno Zeller, ‘The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) – A Leap Forward Towards 
Unified International Sales Laws’ (2000) 12 Pace International Law Review 79, 88, also published at 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/zeller3.html>.   
68 U.S. District Court, 28 August 2001, available at <cisgw3.law.pace.edu/case/010828.html> Also see John Felemegas, ‘The 
Award of Counsel’s Fees Under Article 74 CISG, in Zapata Hermanos Sucesores v. Hearthside Baking Co. (2001) 6 The 
Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 30-38, also available at 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/biblio/felemegas1.html>.  After this paper was completed, the decision of the District Court was 
reversed by the Federal Appellate Court, see <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/02119u1.html>.  Further, at the date of 
publication of this paper the decision of the Federal Appellate Court was the subject of an application for leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of the United States of America, for further information see links at <http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-
74.html>. 
69  Article 74 provides that ‘[d]amages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of 
profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.  Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in 
breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of 
which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.’   
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their own legal expenses, applies.  The court recognised the importance of the international 
character of the CISG and the need to promote uniformity70 and in so doing rejected the 
application of the American Rule.  The court did not succumb to the homeward trend to 
explain the meaning of Article 74.     
The court in Zapata noted that the principle of foreseeability is the limitation on damages 
under Article 74.  This principle was also recognised by a different United States court in Delchi 
Carrier S.p.A. v. Roterex Corp.71 However, in this case the court succumbed to the homeward 
trend to reach its conclusion.  The court found that the ‘CISG requires that damages be limited 
by the familiar principle of foreseeability established in Hadley v. Baxendale’.72  Hadley v. 
Baxendale is a case familiar to all students of the common law system as authority on the 
principle of foreseeability.  By construing foreseeability in Article 74 of the CISG by reference 
to a, common law case and domestic concept the court failed to satisfy the mandate of Article 
7.  By using a domestic concept to interpret the CISG the court did not pay regard to the 
international character of the CISG but succumbed to the homeward trend.   
One further important point to note is that the homeward trend would not pose a threat to the 
uniform application of the CISG if there was a supranational body to hear cases on the 
international sale of good.  However, States were not willing to surrender their sovereignty to a 
CISG court. Instead the task of determining disputes under the CISG has been given to the 
courts of all states.  Accordingly, all courts determining disputes under the CISG must be 
mindful of the important obligations imposed on them under Article 7 of the CISG.   
4.7 Other Resources 
Courts have grappled with issues of uniformity and the international character of treaties other 
than the CISG.  The House of Lords discussed these problems in Scruttons Ltd v Midland 
Silicones Ltd.73  Scruttons case concerned whether of the word ‘carrier’ in the Hague Rules 
included a stevedore.  In reaching a decision Viscount Simonds said:  
‘It is not surprising that the questions in issue in this case should have arisen in other 
jurisdictions where the common law is administered and where the Hague Rules have 
been embodied in the municipal law.  It is (to put it no higher) very desirable that the 
same conclusions should be reached in whatever jurisdiction the question arises.  It 
would be deplorable if the nations should after protracted negotiations reach agreement 
as in the matter of the Hague Rules and that their several courts should then disagree as 
to the meaning of what they appeared to agree on’.74 
The decision of Viscount Simonds is critical for its recognition of the importance of 
maintaining a uniform application of treaties.  It is also interesting for the comment his 
Honour makes on the use of foreign decisions when interpreting an international treaty.  This 
issue is also relevant to the interpretation of the CISG.   
                                                 
70 The court stated that a ‘treaty, occupying international scope as it does and (as in this case) defining the relationships between 
nationals of different signatory countries, calls for uniformity of construction.’ U.S. District Court, 28 August 2001.   
71 71 F.3d 1024 (U.S. Ct. App 2d. Cir. 1995), <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951206u1.html>.  See also Zeller, above n 56, 
88-90.    
72 71 F.3d 1024 (U.S. Ct. App 2d. Cir. 1995). 
73 1 All E.R.  
74 1 All E.R. p.9 per Viscount Simonds. 
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To give effect to the international character of the CISG and ensure uniformity in its 
application, it is not sufficient to simply rely on the text of the CISG.  Rather, ‘uniformity can 
only be attained if the interpreter in interpreting the provisions has regard to the practice of the 
other contracting States.’75  Uniformity requires consideration of foreign case law.   
This requirement gives rise to two practical problems - access to foreign cases and translation to 
a known language.76  Commendable steps have however been undertaken to remedy these 
difficulties.  For example, UNCITRAL in 1988 developed a procedure with the cooperation of 
Contracting States to gather and distribute information about court decisions.  This 
information is now translated into the six official CISG languages and released as part of the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat CLOUT system of standardised reporting through the United 
Nations.77 
As additional ‘antidotes’78 to the danger of divergent interpretations, the legislative history or 
travaus préparatoires of the CISG and academic writing should be used in interpreting the CISG.  
The use of legislative history is an interesting example because it again demonstrates the 
importance of a technique of interpretation that is international rather than domestic in focus.  
This is because common law countries have traditionally been reluctant to refer to legislative 
history as an aid to interpretation.  Civil law countries on the other hand commonly use this 
technique.79 
 
CONCLUSION 
The process of drafting a uniform sales law ran over many decades, involved intense debate, 
required numerous drafts, two failed treaties and, in the end, concessions from all parties 
before a treaty could be agreed upon.  However, the harmonisation process was not complete 
with an agreement on the final text.  The real challenge for harmonisation and the ultimate 
success or failure of the CISG is dependent on its uniform application.  
Article 7 of the CISG recognises the innate problems with maintaining a uniform law.  A treaty 
is not a domestic creature but is a product of the international diplomatic stage.  Treaties 
therefore should not be treated like domestic legislation and respect must be paid to their 
unique ‘international character’.  If in the application of the CISG its international character is 
not respected and a uniform approach is not realised, the hard work and uneasy compromises 
of the diplomats in creating the CISG are futile and the promotion and development of 
international trade is placed in doubt. 
                                                 
75 Ferrari, above n 8, 204.   
76 Felemegas, above n 7. 
77 Ibid.  Other resources include the UNILEX database maintained by The Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law Studies in 
Rome and the Pace University website, which this author can highly recommend.   
78 Professor Honold quoted in Ferrari, above n 8, 206. 
79 Ferrari, above n 8, 207-208. 
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